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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its
ROAD COMMISSION; D. H. WHITTENBURG, Chairman, and LAYTON MAXFIELD and LORENZO
J. BOTT, members of the State Road
Commission,
Plaintiff and Petitioner,
vs.

Case No.
8274

BOLEY, INCORPORATED, a corporation, et al.,
Defendants,
and
BOYD W. CALTON and MARY CALTON,
Intervenors.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND PETITIONER
ON INTERMEDIATE APPEAL

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an interlocutory appeal from an order permitting intervention by respondents in a condemnation pro-
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ceedings. The State of Utah by and through its Road Commission commenced condemnation proceedings in the
Fourth Judicial District Court and sought to condemn
certain property of the defendants, Boley, Incorporated,
a corporation; Phillip Green and Leah Green; Julia Fox
Hunter; Orville Vibbert and Rowene Russon; Mark Vibbert, for highway construction purposes. The intervenors
were the lessees of one C. G. Wilson Helm, the record owner
of a parcel of land adjacent to the highway but not a part
of any of the lands, owned by the above named defendants,
which the State sought to condemn in this proceeding. By
amicable settlement and through warranty deed, the State
had secured from the said C. G. Wilson Helm a strip of
land for right-of-way purposes which was a portion of the
premises that C. G. Wilson Helm had leased to the intervenors and of which the intervenors were in possession.
We are not here in any way concerned with the rights of
the intervenors under their lease agreement. The specific
question here is :
"Can a landowner [lessee] claiming a trespass
by the State maintain an action on such a claim
by intervening in a condemnation proceeding not
involving the claimant's [lessee's] lands allegedly
trespassed upon?"
The following map shows the proximity of the lands
of the defendants to the condemnation proceedings with
relation to the location of the leasehold of the intervenors.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE CLAIM IS NOT PROPERLY AN INTERVENTION.
POINT II.
INTERVENORS HAD NO INTERVENTION OF
RIGHT.
POINT III.
INTERVENORS' CLAIM SHOULD PROPERLY BE PRESENTED TO THE BOARD OF
EXAMINERS.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE CLAIM IS NOT PROPERLY AN INTERVENTION.
Intervenors' motion suggests as its basis "* * *
that the intervenors' defense and the main action herein
have questions of law and fact in common and that the
representation of the intervenors' interest by existing
parties may be inadequate."
An analysis of the main action, and of intervenors'
claim, shows that there is no common question of law or
fact. The issues of the main case are the invariable issues
of condemnation: (1) the public necessity of the taking;
(2) value of property taken; and (3) severance damage.
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Issues presented by intervenors' claim are: (1) whether
the Road Commission's entry was privileged and if not
(2) what damage was done the leasehold interest. It must
be remembered that intervenors' leased land is in no way
the subject of the main condemnation action; it is a different, unrelated tract. The issues of the two cases are
most dissimilar. It is plain that the trial of intervenors'
claim will have to be severed from the trial (or separate
trials) of the main case. A jury could not conceivably
handle both cases at once. Thus, the intervention is nothing but a new, unrelated claim sought to be thrust into a
pending action with which it has nothing in common. There
is as much reason for an intervention into a pending criminal case, or water case, to which the State is a party.
Intervenors also assert that the representation of their
interest in the main case by the named parties may be inadequate. The plain answer is that intervenors have no
interest in the main case. The leased premises are not
sought to be taken ; the landlord is not named a party;
the intervenors do not allege an interest in any land belonging to any named party.
POINT II.
INTERVENORS HAD NO INTERVENTION OF
RIGHT.

Rule 24 (a), Rules of Civil Procedure, U. C. A. 1953,
provides:
"(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely ap. plication anyone shall be permitted to intervene in
an action: (1) when a statute confers an uncondi-
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tional right to intervene; or (2) when the representation of. the applicant's interest by existing parties
is or may be inadequate and the applicant is or may
be bound by a judgment in the action; or (3) when
the applicant is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property which is in the custody or subject to the control
or disposition of the court or an officer thereof."
In resisting the State's "Petition for Intermediate
Appeal," heretofore granted, the intervenors say only that
their motion to intervene was allowed by the trial court
under Rule 24. They do not allege, nor can they, that they
meet any of the requirements of said rule. (1) What statute affords intervenors an unconditional right to intervene? ( 2) Wherein do the existing parties even remotely,
or at all, propose to represent the applicant's interest;
how can the applicant be bound by a judgment in this
cause? (3) What property is in the custody or subject to
the control or disposition of the court below that could
adversely affect any interest of the applicant in his leasehold interest?
Under this rule this Court has said:
"The question to be answered, * * * is * * *
has B [the intervenors] such an interest in the subject-matter in dispute between A [the State] and C
[the defendants] that entitled him to intervene."

Dayton v. Free, et al., 49 Utah 221, 224, 162 P. 614.
We here respectfully contend that intervenors are clearly
without interest in the subject-matter of this cause.
Nor is there a right of "Permissive Intervention" under Rule 24 (b) for: ( 1) There is no statute conferring a
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conditional right; (2) we contend that the applicants'
claim has no question of law or fact in common with that
of the defendants to the State's cause; ( 3) it is clear that
applicants cannot intervene as governmental officers or
agents.
The majority rule is, we think, that: The interest
which entitles a person to intervene in a suit between other
parties must be direct and immediate in character, and not
consequential; and the intervenor must stand to either gain
or lose by direct legal operation and effect of the iudgment.
Utah Power and Light Co. v. Ogden, 95 Utah 161, 79 P. 2d
61; City of Alhambra v. Jacob Bean Realty Co., (Graves,
Intervenor) (Cal.) 31 P. 2d 1052; City of Burlingame v.
County of San Mateo, (Cal.) 230 P. 2d 375, and cases there
cited. See generally "Parties" Key No. 40 (2), American
Digest System.

POINT III.
INTERVENORS' CLAIM SHOULD PROPERLY BE PRESENTED TO THE BOARD OF
EXAMINERS.
Intervenors seek to employ the intervention process
of Rule 24, U. R. C. P., to bring a civil suit against the
State of Utah. The law is clear that this cannot be done.
The question is settled by Hjorth v. Whittenburg, ... Utah
... , 241 P. 2d 907, a factually similar case. See also Campbell Bldg. Co. v. State Road Commission, 95 Utah 242, 70
P. 2d 857.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

The correct forum to determine this claim is the Board
of Examiners, and not the courts. Intervenors apparently
fear that this remedy is not an adequate remedy. The
theoretical answer is that the courts cannot presume that
the executive and legislative departments will fail in their
duty. The practical answer is that the plaintiffs in the
Hjorth case apparently had similar fears. They were adequately compensated. See Item 1, Sec. 18, Ch. 134, Laws
of Utah 1953.

CONCLUSION
The order of the court below permitting intervention
should be set aside.
Respectfully

submi~ed,

E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
JOHN W. HORSLEY,
Assistant Attorney General,
WALTER L. BUDGE,
Assistant Attorney General,
Counsel for Plaintiff and Petitioner.
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